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Abstract 
Annexing the pragmatist dogma to the empiricist theory of sets in connection with the theory 
of a priori measure， we obtain some important renovations， particularly in the context with ordinal 
numbers 
1. Introduction 
In the previous paper1l we posited the following pragmatist dogma:α conl-
pletely uηfounded mere abstraction can give only a meaningless object. Applying 
this dogma as a principle of induction， we have a very powerful device in the 
analytical logic (i. e.， in the set-theoretical logic). The empiricist pragmatism is 
the logical analysis which uses this principle in the empiricist theory of sets 
(particularly in connection with the theory of a priori measure勺 Wepreviously 
have obtained the following two conclusions in the empiricist pragmatism. 
1 (Principle N A). 11 M is a practical1l set and 
(VXcM)(X isゑ-meαsurable**. =?. i元X= 0)， (1. 1) 
then it must be that lvI is m，-measurable and 
i話¥M=O.
I (Lemma E). 11 seお
M1c二M2c二・・
αu are i哨 leasurabZeωzdlvI= uMk， then we hω 記
iiiM = lim 弘Mk •
If a description As which de五nesa collection S of elements in a given universe 
U implies that 
(VaE U)(aES. V.aιS)， 
then S is called a descr争tivecollection or an aggregate. In this paper an 
aggregate is assumed to be taken in a euclidean space of finite dimension E. 
To date， some examples of non-measurable sets (with respect to the Lebesgue 
measure) have been shown through constructions on ordinal numbers. However， 
in Principle N A， evev if we take ‘an aggregate' instead of‘a practical set'， it Is 
*紀国谷芳雄
* I五-measureis the empiricist generalization of Lebesgue measure. 
(207) 
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apparent that any part of M cannot be destined to be of positive 品measure.
50， in the empiricist pragmatism， we may reasonably adopt the following asser-
tlOn as an axlO立1.
Axiom NA. 1f仰 aggregateM satisfies the condition (1.1)， M isゑ.
meωurable and 
伝M=O.
If M 1S an aggregate and if飢 isthe collection of al m・measurablesub-
aggregates contained in M， then， as readily seen，加eis an aggregate (of sub-
aggregates). In this case， if
sup i五x=α
xεm 
there exists an increasing sequence of iルmeasurablesubaggregates of M 
M1cM2c二・ cM
such that lim 仮Mk=αThen，if N is an m-measurable subaggregate contained 
in M-UMk， itmust be that 
勿~N=O.
50， by Lemma E and Axiom N A， we may r田 chthe following conclusion. 
Proposition 1. 1. EverツaggregateM is i五・measurable，under the convention 
that 五M=∞ is also allowed to be α case. 
According to Proposition 1. 1 an aggregate is called a (determinate) set in the 
meaning that it is descriptive and品measurable. Thus， the empiricist theory of 
sets may， in the empiricist pragmatism， be renovated in many sides， standing on 
the foundations above-stated. 
2. F ramed Increase 
Being given a family (or a collection) of collections of points (in E)羽=
(A，)(tε1)， if1 is simply ordered， i.e.， 
(Vt，κε1) (t手IC.二>:t<IC. V. t>IC) 
and if 
t<IC .二>.A，cA，: & :A，cA，.今.t<IC， 
then W is called a framed increase of collections (in E). If， in addition， 1 and 
al A， are descriptive， ~ is called a descriptive increase. 
In case of a descriptive increase， the union 
A= U，E1A， 
is evidently an aggregate， so that by Proposition 1.1 we have: 
Proposition 2.1. 1f W=(A，) (tEI) is a descriptive increase and 
A= U，E1A" 
(208) 
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then there is foundαreal number αsuch that 
t五A=α，
otherwise 
伝A=∞.
If we have 
UA日守とA，
for every enumerable sequence (九)(k=1，2，…)， then 21. is said to be of unfin-
ishable砂ρe. Proposition 2. 1 may be reckoned to hold even when A is of 
un五nishabletype. Now， ifsup 伝A，=s<∞ (inProposition 2.1) we have 
P ミα. 
In this case， ifs <α， we evidently have 
(¥:1ぽ 1)(綴(A-A，)>α-s)，
so that 
limm(A-AJ>α-s三 d>O.
Then， there must be promised an atmosphere (]A -U A，[)3) for which it is 
destined that 
後(]A-U AJ) > o . 
However， ifwe assert such a peculiar state to be involved in the simple de五111・
tion‘A -U A/ on our a priori ground， itmay not give other than an incom-
pitent assignment for 1nA. Hence it may be no other than a mere abstract 
imagination and so it may be taken as meaningless， in the empiricist pragmatism. 
Thus we may conclude: 
then 
Proposition 2.2. If 21. = (AJ(tε1) is a descriptive increase and 
A =U，E1A" 
t勿花A= sup i勿詩
gεI 
3. On the Ordinal Numbers 
If a collection of ordinal type A is not a descriptive collection， A is expelled， 
in our view， from the concept of a determinate collection. So， by grace of 
Proposition 1. 1， any aggregate of ordinal numbers is consideredみmeasurable，
hence as a set. In the empiricist theory the method of transfinite induction is 
not generally admitted. However， when using the whole arrangement of the 
ordinal numbers， this method may naturally be recognized to correspond to the 
(209) 
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ordinal construction of a collection. So， we may take this method as a fictive 
one restricted within the collections of ordinal numbers. Then， in virtue of 
Proposition 2. 2， we may readily prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.1. Every切el・orderedset must be of ;みrneasurezero. 
So， we directly have: 
Proposition 3. 1. In empiricist Jうragmatism，no ordinal number can be 
admitted to correゅondto the real continuum. 
To conclude Proposition 3.1 the following will also give a demonstration. 
From the interval [0， 1]let us take a subset Ll of 1:元-measurezero， then another 
subset L2 of 五-m回 surezero such as 
L1cL2・
Continuing this process， we may obtain a framed increase of subsets (of [0， 1]) of 
tルmeasurezero (L，) (!E1). Apart from the selection of such an increase， we hlay 
observe it only as the existence of such an increase. 1 may be assumed to 
correspond to an ordinal (number). Therefore， assuming 1 as the supremum of 
such ordinals， we come across a contradiction in that we may then， by virtue of 
Proposition 2.2， conclude that 
伝UL，=O.
4. Extension 
By事(A)indicating that a set A has the property弔， if for any set A (in B) 
it is destined that 
弔(A).V.'""事(A)， 
~ is said to be descriptive. For a descriptive property弔， if it is always destined 
that 
AcBcE. & . ~(B): 今.弔 (A)， (4. 1) 
~ is said to be regressive and then， in the relation (4. 1)， B is called an extension 
of A in respect to司3. If a descriptive increase of sets羽=(AJ(!ε1) satis五esthe 
condition 
(V!ε1)(弔(人))
for a regressive property弔， "l( is called an extension increase (in respect to ~). 
If a collection A is considered to have a certain descriptive property， A must 
be descriptive， because a non-descriptive collection is thought， in the empiricist 
pragmatism， to be meaningless and so to be expelled from our course. Hence， 
in producing any collection A on condition that ト ~(A)*， we may always expect 
A to be descriptive. 
* 1、hisrenders 宵(A)is true' . 
(210) 
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If there exists an extension increase S[( = (AJ (tE 1) in respect to弔 andif for 
any set B (in E) it is ascertained that 
UA，三AcB.二手，._.司3(B)， 
羽 issaid to be maximal and then A is called an extension limit in respect to 
~. If A学E，~ is said to be mαximizable by S[(. 
Now， in developing any extension increase 21， we shall necessarily be imposed 
the following two matters to examine: 
(i) Extensibility : 
(ヨ〉尚早E)(BCA.& ト事(A))， 
i. e.， itis decidable either ~ is extensible beyond a given set B or not; 
(i) Maximizabiliか:it is decidable either ~ is maximizable or not. 
In view of the above-stated preliminary de五nitionsand investigations， itis 
readily a伍rmedthat， excepting the problem of real practicality， both of (i) and 
(i) can be expected as decidable. Hence， ifa concrete property弔 isreally 
proved to be descriptive and to be maximizable， we may certainly be promised 
a (norトtrivial)maximal extension increase. In this case， we say that a trans-
induction is promised or a trans-inductive mode is established for the extension 
in resrect to司3. In our view of the empiricist pragmatism， itwill be specially 
fair that， throughout the process of trans-induction， al intermediate extensions 
A， and the extension limit A can always be expected as m-measurable. 
5. Unexhaustible Null and Metamorphosis 
If， for a set AcB (in B)， there exists a set A' such that AcA'cB，ト事(A')
and m (A' -A) = 0， then ~ is said to have unexhaustible null above A in B. 
Then， the following theorem is readily proved. 
Proposition 5. 1. lf there isαset B of finite 弘明
~ト弔(B)， 
and if a non叩 oidextension increase S[(呈(A，)(tε1) in re学ectto ~ is such re・
stricted as 
(Vt) (A，cB) 
and if事 lS unmαximizable by S[(， then ~ has unexhαustible null above the 
limit A= UA，・
On an extension limit A in respect to a descriptive property弔， following 
two cases are distinguished: 
(i) ト~(A)， then ~ is said to be closed in the framed increase S[( of which 
A is the limit; 
(i) ，...._ト ~(A) ， then it is said that ~ has a metamoゆhosisby S[( or S[( is 
(211) 
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可3-metamorphic.
To the question if there always exists a ~-metamorphic extension increase 
in respect to any property事whichhas unexhaustible null in a certain set of五nite
m，-measure， the answer is negative. For instance， as for the property事 defined
by ~(A)=(mA~α< ∞)， if a <1.元'B<∞， apparentlyヰ3has unexhaustible null in 
B， but no metamorphosis is found by any extension increase in respect to ~ (in 
virtue of Proposition 2. 2). 
Taking E as the set of al real numbers， if~(A)三(Pr(xEA)=O) ， it is found 
that ~ is unmaximizable and has a metamorphosis by the extension increase 
(Ak) (k= 1，2，…) (A，，=( -k， k)， because then E= U Ak and """ト ~(E) while (Vk= 
1，え…)(ト ~(Ak))'
Addendum. If investigations are to be made on a general topological space 
or on a non-metric space， the problems must accordingly be complicated. In 
these cases， ifsets of real numbers or of points of a euclidean space are made 
to correspond， by a certain operation， to the aggregates in the original space， the 
analysis will then be clari五edin that al of the五guresets on this correspondence 
can be expected as m-measurable. When no such means of correspondence is 
found， itshall be noted that， with no concrete practical instances to be involved， 
mere abstract processes are possibly disposed to fal into meaninglessness on the 
empinclst pragmatIsm. 
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